Positive Controls, Intuitions, and Experience: Kantian and the empirists' different thinkings （文） 寫實 [73]
Positive Controls, Intuitions, and Experience: Kantian and the empirists' different thinkings
A measurement A (as in an analogy, a scale) is employed to measure (as in the analogy, to weigh diamonds, then the latter can be used to calibrate other scales) the parameters in the positive control group (for the example as in the same analogy, diamonds). Then the mean variables of such a positive control can be employed as to calibrate other measurements, e.g. that in a studied sample or cohort, as well as to evaluate the exactitude and precision of the first measurement A (for the same analogy, the first scale) at some other points (of time). In fact, there is a standardized difference. The ground of such a protocol of standardized difference is based on the existence as follows. Notwithstanding the values of variables, such as in the analogy of the values of weights, it may be customary and high-handed, the underpinning steadfastness of the matter, such as the constancy of weight, the a priori, is not.
Hence, in the rear of this aforestated expression and analogy is to illustrate as follows. Wth such a material thing, as in the context of this author and his coworkers own study, the nature of target cells, that of the effector cells, and that of positive control, which are all actual and unequivocal, not fictitious or imaginary, it is entirely possible to question the reliability of the methods of measurement used. Such methods might as well be called pramana in the ancient Indian philosophy (Matilal, B, 1986), that is the causes of a knowledge event (of the effector and the target cells, along with, of positive control in the context of the mentioned study) by being the methods for comprehension. Accordingly, in the further evaluation of such causes of a knowledge event, there are findings as follow. First, such causes by being unambiguous, there is no reasonable ground to question the reliability of such causes in question. This is not to imply that such causes are the a priori in the meaning of being independent of experience but rather it is consistent with the array of other causes, along with the base of a collection of facts and rules of reasoning : the knowledge base.
As to the nature of the a priori intuitions, it is noteworthy as follows. Unlike our usual and customary way of understanding, which is digressive, that is, thinks via concepts, all human intuitions are sensible. Kant even states that 'our nature so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible' (Kemp Smith, 1965, 75). As Kant mentions originally both a priori and empirical intuitions, his statement as previously cited is unfortunately somewhat confusing. Such a statement should have been better read as 'our intuitions [of objects] can never be other than sensible.' The reason is as follows. The a priori intuitions are different from empirical ones in such a way that for the former (the a priori intuitions) 'alone the sensation can be posited in a certain form' (Kemp Smith, 1965, p. 34), but for the latter (empirical intuitions), they are actually our immediate awareness of objects.
Be it as it may, in fact, sensible intuitions supply the content for judgment, in which the categories are used. Given Kant's epistemology, knowing something as an object of experience does require sensible intuitions. Such intuitions can thus match to a categorical judgment about that object. (Kemp Smith, pp. 34, and 75) Hence, there is the relationship of categories to sensible intuitions. Such a relationship, in its own meaning, mounts up to the categories, which are thus applied in experience.
In Kant's Copernicum Revolution, it is as well to state that every single one experience is sorted out through, prearranged by, and makes itself accessible to us in very much complicated epistemological fashions. Given what have been stated, in short, Kant's concept of experience is that it is "subordinated to an epistemological role." (Schrag, 1969, p. 248)
Notwithstanding, in all fairness, it may be pointed out that others do not all believe Kantian thinking. Some of them, such as Whitehead (1929, 1978), Schrag (1969, p. 127) and Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 1999, pp. 52-63) consider that there are other ways to think about experience. In addition, there is a propensity that can be tracked to the empiricists.
With what has be reviewed starting from the meaning of pramana, according to the ancient Indian philosophy, a means of valid knowing, the collection of a array of facts and rules of reasoning, knowledge base, experience, the a priori in the meaning of being independent of experience, Kantian concept of experience, and Kantian theory of the relationship of categories to sensible intuitions, along with the above, there it comes a short list of the fine names of other authors who do not believe Kantian thinking of experience. At least, we have reached the impression of the a priori intuitions.
A measurement A (as in an analogy, a scale) is employed to measure (as in the analogy, to weigh diamonds, then the latter can be used to calibrate other scales) the parameters in the positive control group (for the example as in the same analogy, diamonds). Then the mean variables of such a positive control can be employed as to calibrate other measurements, e.g. that in a studied sample or cohort, as well as to evaluate the exactitude and precision of the first measurement A (for the same analogy, the first scale) at some other points (of time). In fact, there is a standardized difference. The ground of such a protocol of standardized difference is based on the existence as follows. Notwithstanding the values of variables, such as in the analogy of the values of weights, it may be customary and high-handed, the underpinning steadfastness of the matter, such as the constancy of weight, the a priori, is not.
Hence, in the rear of this aforestated expression and analogy is to illustrate as follows. Wth such a material thing, as in the context of this author and his coworkers own study, the nature of target cells, that of the effector cells, and that of positive control, which are all actual and unequivocal, not fictitious or imaginary, it is entirely possible to question the reliability of the methods of measurement used. Such methods might as well be called pramana in the ancient Indian philosophy (Matilal, B, 1986), that is the causes of a knowledge event (of the effector and the target cells, along with, of positive control in the context of the mentioned study) by being the methods for comprehension. Accordingly, in the further evaluation of such causes of a knowledge event, there are findings as follow. First, such causes by being unambiguous, there is no reasonable ground to question the reliability of such causes in question. This is not to imply that such causes are the a priori in the meaning of being independent of experience but rather it is consistent with the array of other causes, along with the base of a collection of facts and rules of reasoning : the knowledge base.
As to the nature of the a priori intuitions, it is noteworthy as follows. Unlike our usual and customary way of understanding, which is digressive, that is, thinks via concepts, all human intuitions are sensible. Kant even states that 'our nature so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible' (Kemp Smith, 1965, 75). As Kant mentions originally both a priori and empirical intuitions, his statement as previously cited is unfortunately somewhat confusing. Such a statement should have been better read as 'our intuitions [of objects] can never be other than sensible.' The reason is as follows. The a priori intuitions are different from empirical ones in such a way that for the former (the a priori intuitions) 'alone the sensation can be posited in a certain form' (Kemp Smith, 1965, p. 34), but for the latter (empirical intuitions), they are actually our immediate awareness of objects.
Be it as it may, in fact, sensible intuitions supply the content for judgment, in which the categories are used. Given Kant's epistemology, knowing something as an object of experience does require sensible intuitions. Such intuitions can thus match to a categorical judgment about that object. (Kemp Smith, pp. 34, and 75) Hence, there is the relationship of categories to sensible intuitions. Such a relationship, in its own meaning, mounts up to the categories, which are thus applied in experience.
In Kant's Copernicum Revolution, it is as well to state that every single one experience is sorted out through, prearranged by, and makes itself accessible to us in very much complicated epistemological fashions. Given what have been stated, in short, Kant's concept of experience is that it is "subordinated to an epistemological role." (Schrag, 1969, p. 248)
Notwithstanding, in all fairness, it may be pointed out that others do not all believe Kantian thinking. Some of them, such as Whitehead (1929, 1978), Schrag (1969, p. 127) and Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 1999, pp. 52-63) consider that there are other ways to think about experience. In addition, there is a propensity that can be tracked to the empiricists.
With what has be reviewed starting from the meaning of pramana, according to the ancient Indian philosophy, a means of valid knowing, the collection of a array of facts and rules of reasoning, knowledge base, experience, the a priori in the meaning of being independent of experience, Kantian concept of experience, and Kantian theory of the relationship of categories to sensible intuitions, along with the above, there it comes a short list of the fine names of other authors who do not believe Kantian thinking of experience. At least, we have reached the impression of the a priori intuitions.
Tags: Controls, Experience, Intuitions, Kantian, Positive, empirists, the
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