On Aboutness （文） 寫實 [74]
On Aboutness
[74]
There is a connection between aboutness and epistemology as it constitutes another connection between the meaning of aboutness and two distinct epistemological sights: One, the document oriented sight, which highlights the objective extremity: the documents to be indexed, and the other, the request oriented sight, which highlights the subjective extremity: the questions, which the indexing is supposed to help answering. Noticeably, epistemology per se is very much about both objectivity and subjectivity.
That having been discussed, because Kant passed away before the notion of
intentionality was introduced, no direct relation between Kant and the theory of
intentionality can be found. It appears that possible indirect links should be an
object of a separate study. Nevertheless, in this article, what is new in
knowledge presented here, is to correlate part of Kant’s theory for its application to these three U
S perpetrator's behaviour. In the philosophical sense of intentionality, however, this is merely a special case of general features of mental states, its aboutness; in a profound way, the mental states and intentionality appear to be related with each other. (Aquinas 1266/1945, Freeman 1999). Nevertheless, Dennett believes that intentionality is ascribed to anything (Dennett, 1981, 1996). In contrast, Searle means that intentionality really exists. (Searle, 1998). This does not exclude the possibility that we may ascribe it sometimes even erroneously. For example, if one assumes that some objects are living; and when one briefly observes a mechanical cat, one may erroneously classify it as a living being. From Dennett's point of view, one could talk about "live stance", i.e.,
there is no life as such but only a stance to it. Most people, however (and even including Dennett himself!) believe that there are living object in reality. Likewise, Searle believes in the reality of intentionality.
Nevertheless, it is very unfortunate that the two words, intention and intentionality, are so similar in English. However, Brentano introduced the term intentionality directly from Latin (1995) , and Dennett devotes many pages to the characteristic differences among the following THREE terms: intention, intentionality, and, finally, intensionality.
The last term, intensionality, is a linguistic term meaning those aspects of meaning, which are open for the subject. For example, when one speaks about the morning star, one can mean that it is blue, that it is in fact not a star but a planet, that this planet is about 40 mio km from the Earth, etc. These are components of one’s intensional meaning of the concept "morning star". At the same time, when one says "morning star", one really means, as well, that the evening star is a planet, that it is about 40 mio. km from the Earth, etc. These are components of the extentional meaning of "morning star", but not of the inensional meaning, as far as one does not know that morning star and evening star are the same one. The term, intensionality, shed little lights on the differentiations among those different perpetrators in the U S.
Conversely, as aforementioned, intentionality implies that a mental state is "about" something outside the mind. This is almost equally true for a normal human adult's mental state, for a schizophrenic's mental state and for a dog's mental state. Therefore, there is no straightforward connection between intentionality on the one hand, and responsibility and choice on the other hand. Jordan & Ghin even claim that intentionality is a property of all living beings, including prokaryots. (Jordan & Ghin 2007) Hence, it hardly can observe a legal application of the intentionality theory. On the other hand, as the definition of intentionality concerns "mental states", it can be applied for any discipline working with the notion of mental states, e.g., psychology, philosophy, or psychiatry.
Though Dennett clearly distinguishes between intentionalty and intention, he means intentionality rather than intention in his “Intentional stance" theory. For example, if we say that "my computer is tired", we don't mean to accuse the computer in a court, we don't imply the computer's responsibility and choice. In
fact, we would in fact mean the responsibility of the programmer, i.e., a human person.
There is, in fact, nothing mysterious about the intentions and conscious feelings towards others, according to Dennett. We sometimes assign feelings or intentions to non-human things. Dennett recommends that we might say, for example, our personal computer is a bit tired today, or that our flowerpot is thirsty this afternoon. At the end of the day, our own stance to other human beings is just an adaptation - a much more complex adaptation. Thus, why do we hesitate to assign human quality to non-human things? In this passage Dennett clearly means INTENTIONS, NOT INTENTIONALITY. Further
[74]
There is a connection between aboutness and epistemology as it constitutes another connection between the meaning of aboutness and two distinct epistemological sights: One, the document oriented sight, which highlights the objective extremity: the documents to be indexed, and the other, the request oriented sight, which highlights the subjective extremity: the questions, which the indexing is supposed to help answering. Noticeably, epistemology per se is very much about both objectivity and subjectivity.
That having been discussed, because Kant passed away before the notion of
intentionality was introduced, no direct relation between Kant and the theory of
intentionality can be found. It appears that possible indirect links should be an
object of a separate study. Nevertheless, in this article, what is new in
knowledge presented here, is to correlate part of Kant’s theory for its application to these three U
S perpetrator's behaviour. In the philosophical sense of intentionality, however, this is merely a special case of general features of mental states, its aboutness; in a profound way, the mental states and intentionality appear to be related with each other. (Aquinas 1266/1945, Freeman 1999). Nevertheless, Dennett believes that intentionality is ascribed to anything (Dennett, 1981, 1996). In contrast, Searle means that intentionality really exists. (Searle, 1998). This does not exclude the possibility that we may ascribe it sometimes even erroneously. For example, if one assumes that some objects are living; and when one briefly observes a mechanical cat, one may erroneously classify it as a living being. From Dennett's point of view, one could talk about "live stance", i.e.,
there is no life as such but only a stance to it. Most people, however (and even including Dennett himself!) believe that there are living object in reality. Likewise, Searle believes in the reality of intentionality.
Nevertheless, it is very unfortunate that the two words, intention and intentionality, are so similar in English. However, Brentano introduced the term intentionality directly from Latin (1995) , and Dennett devotes many pages to the characteristic differences among the following THREE terms: intention, intentionality, and, finally, intensionality.
The last term, intensionality, is a linguistic term meaning those aspects of meaning, which are open for the subject. For example, when one speaks about the morning star, one can mean that it is blue, that it is in fact not a star but a planet, that this planet is about 40 mio km from the Earth, etc. These are components of one’s intensional meaning of the concept "morning star". At the same time, when one says "morning star", one really means, as well, that the evening star is a planet, that it is about 40 mio. km from the Earth, etc. These are components of the extentional meaning of "morning star", but not of the inensional meaning, as far as one does not know that morning star and evening star are the same one. The term, intensionality, shed little lights on the differentiations among those different perpetrators in the U S.
Conversely, as aforementioned, intentionality implies that a mental state is "about" something outside the mind. This is almost equally true for a normal human adult's mental state, for a schizophrenic's mental state and for a dog's mental state. Therefore, there is no straightforward connection between intentionality on the one hand, and responsibility and choice on the other hand. Jordan & Ghin even claim that intentionality is a property of all living beings, including prokaryots. (Jordan & Ghin 2007) Hence, it hardly can observe a legal application of the intentionality theory. On the other hand, as the definition of intentionality concerns "mental states", it can be applied for any discipline working with the notion of mental states, e.g., psychology, philosophy, or psychiatry.
Though Dennett clearly distinguishes between intentionalty and intention, he means intentionality rather than intention in his “Intentional stance" theory. For example, if we say that "my computer is tired", we don't mean to accuse the computer in a court, we don't imply the computer's responsibility and choice. In
fact, we would in fact mean the responsibility of the programmer, i.e., a human person.
There is, in fact, nothing mysterious about the intentions and conscious feelings towards others, according to Dennett. We sometimes assign feelings or intentions to non-human things. Dennett recommends that we might say, for example, our personal computer is a bit tired today, or that our flowerpot is thirsty this afternoon. At the end of the day, our own stance to other human beings is just an adaptation - a much more complex adaptation. Thus, why do we hesitate to assign human quality to non-human things? In this passage Dennett clearly means INTENTIONS, NOT INTENTIONALITY. Further
Tags: Aboutness, Dennett, Intention, Intentionality, Kant, Philosophy
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